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A B S T R A C T
The objective of this paper is to analyse the retail banking behaviour in Portugal (2008–2010, 2011–2013 and 
2014–2016), by taking into account the financial and economic assistance programme (FEAP) – monitored by the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund – that Portugal went 
through and that started in 2011. With competitive dynamics it is possible to understand the evolution of competi-
tive strategies of the institutions of a strategic group within a given time horizon. Data were collected after consul-
tation of reports and accounts of Banks from Banco de Portugal database. The results were analysed and discussed 
in light of the theory of strategic groups and their competitive dynamics allows us to conclude that: Banks imple-
mented different competitive strategies; Strategic groups have dissimilar resources; and Strategic groups display 
different strategies. The 2008–2010 period can be considered as a ‘deregulated’ period, the 2011–2013 as a period 
of ‘imposed regulation’, and the 2014–2016 as a period of ‘strategic consolidation’ with strategic changes that have 
prompted strategic groupings of the various institutions as consequence of a low mobility barrier strategy.
Keywords: Strategic Groups; Competitive Dynamics; Strategy; Banking Industry; Portugal
R E S U M E N
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el comportamiento del sector bancario minorista en Portugal (2008-2010, 
2011-2013 y 2014-2016), teniendo en cuenta el programa de asistencia económica y financiera (FEAP) —moni-
toreado por la Comisión Europea, el Banco Central Europeo y el fondo Monetario Internacional— que Portugal 
atravesó y que empezó en el 2011. La dinámica competitiva permite comprender la evolución de las estrategias 
competitivas de las instituciones de un grupo estratégico dentro de un determinado horizonte temporal. La re-
colección de datos se realizó a través de la consulta de los informes y datos contables de los años analizados. Los 
resultados analizados y discutidos a la luz de la teoría de los grupos estratégicos y de la dinámica competitiva nos 
permiten concluir que: las instituciones bancarias tienen diferentes estrategias competitivas; los grupos estraté-
gicos no tienen recursos similares; y las estrategias difieren entre los grupos estratégicos. El período 2008-2010 
puede considerarse como un período ‘desregulado’, el 2011-2013 como un período de ‘regulación impuesta’ y el 
2014-2016 como un período de ‘consolidación estratégica’ con cambios estratégicos que han dado lugar a agrupa-
ciones estratégicas de las diversas instituciones como consecuencia de una estrategia de barrera de baja movilidad.
Palabras clave: Grupos Estratégicos; Dinámica Competitiva; Estrategia; Sector Bancario; Portugal
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of strategic groups (SGs) is not something new, 
being at the core of strategic management (Hervás et al. 2006; 
Chen and Miller 2012, Bonetti and Schiavone 2014). It involves 
the study of how a small group of rival companies engage in 
rivalry against other groups of rival companies, shaping the 
structure of rivalry within an industry (Porter 1980; Cattani 
et  al. 2017). As such, one can argue that SGs follow similar 
strategies despite their different motivations and results (Chen 
and Miller 2012; Gur and Greckhamer 2018).
Research on SGs analyses both intra- and inter-SGs re-
lationships and rivalry between companies and groups (e.g., 
Leask and Parker 2007; Ebbes et al. 2010; Pätäri et al. 2011; 
Bonetti and Schiavone 2014; Anwar and Hasnu 2016), which 
may lead to the study of competitive dynamics and how 
performance and stability differ among SGs over time (e.g., 
Más-Ruiz and Sala 1992; Reger and Huff 1993; Martins et al. 
2010).
The concept of SGs implies that corporate strategies re-
sult in a certain degree of homogeneity among the companies 
within a SG and heterogeneity between SGs. Evidence of ho-
mogeneity within the SGs and heterogeneity between SGs over 
a given time period leads to strategic stability periods in the 
industry during such period. This strategic stability entails the 
existence of entry barriers for companies to enter a given SG, 
and of mobility barriers for companies to swap among SGs 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2004a; Garcés-Cano 2007; Garcés-Cano 
and Duque-Oliva 2008; Rebière and Mavoori 2019).
Evidence of high mobility barriers, isolation mechanisms 
and other type of asymmetries are characteristics of oligopo-
listic sectoral structures (Garcés-Cano and Duque-Oliva 
2008), and Garcés-Cano (2007) claim that the reasons that 
lead organisations to compete intensely in the short term 
within SGs are the same that lead them to seek for long-term 
strategic stability in their SGs. This is clearly shaped by the 
size and scale of the activities of organisations within the in-
dustry they compete, i. e. their real competitive strength is 
determined by its degree of monopoly or market power. This 
is an aspect of relevance, especially in the light of the banking 
system.
The study of the competitive dynamics of SGs may pro-
vide clarification on the positioning of a company and of its 
competitors, thereby increasing their anticipation ability, by 
foreseeing the strategic actions and reactions of companies 
within a SG. This has been done in several contexts, such as 
the bioenergy industry, in which Pätäri et al. (2011) compare 
actors in the bioenergy, in the leisure industry, in which Li and 
Srinivasan (2019) demonstrate that the sharing economy plat-
forms have strongly influenced traditional industries, and tra-
ditional industries, in which Escobar and Vredenburg (2011) 
analyse the sustainable development pressures multinational 
companies felt in their strategic responses to social investment 
and climate change.
The banking industry has also been analysed. For example, 
Más-Ruiz (1999) analysed how the number of players, compo-
sition and strategy of SGs changed over time. Zúñiga-Vicente 
et  al. (2004a) analysed the strategic stability of the SGs dur-
ing periods of huge environmental disturbances. The asym-
metry f rivalry within and between SGs has been addressed 
by Más-Ruiz et al. (2014), who claim that dominant positions 
tolerated. Some studies on SGs and competitive dynamics in 
the banking industry are analysed in Table 1, although there 
are more (e.g., Maudos and Pastor 2003; Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 
2004a; Zúñiga-Vicente et  al. 2004b; Garcés-Cano 2007; Lo-
zano-Vivas and Pastor 2010).
It is known that the Portuguese banking system went 
through an unprecedented economic/financial crisis, which 
led to the implementation of a recapitalisation programme – 
known as the Financial and Economic Assistance Programme 
(FEAP) – monitored by the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
FEAP started in 2011 and ended in 2014. However, although 
prior research has recognised the importance and reaction 
of companies to different contextual shocks in the banking 
industry, there is no study on how the banking industry was 
affected by an external intervention programme – which is 
a very specific environmental shock – in a period of crisis, 
on the response behaviour of the players over time. As such, 
taking into account the SGs can be identified in the bank-
ing industry and their structure over time was supposed to be 
stable over time, this paper seeks to answer the following two 
research questions (RQs), based on the context of external in-
tervention of FEAP that is supposed to have affected the Por-
tuguese banking industry: RQ1 – What are the main strategic 
groups that emerged over time?; RQ2 – How was competitive 
dynamics in the banking industry affected as a result of the 
FEAP?
As such, the main objective of this article is to analyse the 
competitive dynamics of SGs as a result of the external recap-
italisation programme via the FEAP. To this end, the com-
petitive dynamics of SGs in Portugal’s banking sector in the 
2008–2010, 2011-2013 and 2014-2016 periods was analysed, 
and so the following specific objectives have been formulated: 
(i) identifying whether there are differences in the compo-
sition of SGs in the periods under analysis; (ii) identifying 
whether there are differences in the competitive dynamics 
between SGs in the periods under analysis; (iii) identifying 
which changes occur regarding the actors that make up the 
SGs; and (iv) identifying whether there are differences in the 
results in SGs.
Given the relevance of the banking industry, in general, 
and of the banking industry in the context of a small country 
as Portugal, in particular, this study is of added value for two 
main reasons: a) the lack of previous studies on how pervasive 
a FEAP programme can be for the competitive dynamics in 
the banking industry; and b) it compares the banking industry 
in three different periods of time: before, during and after the 
external intervention via the FEAP. For the Portuguese context 
this is a novel study in the banking industry. Based on the scar-
city of studies addressing external intervention programmes, 
we aim to contribute to the understanding of the strategic be-
haviour among SGs and competitive dynamics of the banking 
industry.
This paper is structured as follows: after this introduction, 
section 2 presents the literature review on competitive dynam-
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ics and strategic groups; section 3 characterises the Portuguese 
banking system; section 4 provides information about the 
methods used; section 5 presents the main results; and section 
6 briefly presents the main conclusions.
2. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC GROUPS
Companies are in constant interaction with their com-
petitors, committed to defend their market positions and to 
conquer market share (Smith et al. 2001). Those interactions 
cause a set of actions and reactions, fostering competitive be-
haviour leading competitors to react to achieve a competitive 
positioning (Chen et  al. 1992; Yu and Cannella 2007; Chen 
and Miller 2014; Meilich 2019). As a result of such compet-
itive interactions, companies actively fight for a competitive 
advantage, seeking profitability or market shares (Chen and 
Hambrick 1995; Ferrier 2001; Cattani et  al. 2017). Under-
standing these mechanisms is a key factor to understand the 
market and competitors (Smith et  al. 2001; Ketchen et  al. 
2004; Gur and Greckhamer 2018; Rebière and Mavoori 2019), 
since companies foster competitive advantages that can be 
translated into long-term sustainability of the adopted cor-
porate strategy.
Hunt (1972) defends that an industry can be grouped in 
several SGs, arguing that they could be composed of compa-
nies following similar strategies. Therefore, SGs are useful to 
study the competition within an industry (Porter 1980).
Although the study of SGs has been known since the mid-
1980s, the focus was on the causes and consequences of rival-
ry among companies, whose approach became known as com-
petitive dynamics. In this context, several studies have been 
developed (e.g., Mascarenhas 1989; Chen and Miller 2012; 
Chen et al. 2017) seeking to analyse the competitive dynam-
ics of SGs and to explain how they are established, based on a 
strategic orientation.
If some analyse the study of the SGs’ internal structure 
(e.g., McNamara et  al. 2003), others analyse the role of the 
SG in the strategic orientation in the decision-making in the 
company’s competitive behaviour (e.g., Chen and Miller 2012, 
2014) and in the competitive dynamics behaviour of the SG 
within a given time period (e.g., Mascarenhas 1989; Lee et al. 
2002; DeSarbo et al. 2009). Another perspective analyses the 
profitability of companies among SGs by taking into account 
the barriers to mobility (Prior and Surroca 2006).
Research on SGs shows that companies react differently 
to the actions of their rivals, whether such actions are under-
taken by companies in the same SG or in another SG (e.g., 
Leask and Parker 2007; Dhandapani et  al. 2019). Moreover, 
not all members of a SG have similar returns, as there may be 
some differences in their profiles and risk levels (Garcés-Ca-
no and Duque-Oliva 2008). Table 1 identifies the main studies 
on the dynamics of SGs in the banking industry. This focus 
emerges from the research on understanding the changes in 
the strategy of the SG and/or the number of SGs over time 
(Mascarenhas 1989). Although theory claims that the evolu-
tion of SGs is relatively stable over time, companies within a 
SG may show different evolutionary strategic paths over time 
(DeSarbo et al. 2009; Chen and Miller 2014).
During a deregulated period, the behaviour of the companies 
within and between SGs is asymmetrical. Dominant SGs expect 
strong retaliation from companies in their own group, but with 
great strategic propensity to minimise responses from compa-
nies within a smaller SG (Más-Ruiz et al. 2014). In this context, 
the size of the SGs is a determinant factor in complex industries 
undergoing changes. As such, managers need to analyse the en-
vironment from the point of view of each competing strategic 
group (Más-Ruiz et al. 2005). Conversely, companies in a given 
SG can anticipate intra group rivalry and such competitive be-
haviours are detected by companies from other SGs (Más-Ruiz 
and Moreno 2011).
It is important to understand the strategic changes imple-
mented by each company within each SG to properly understand 
the behavior of the industry (Garcés-Cano and Duque-Oliva 
2008). Thus, competitive dynamics reflects the constant and 
continuous competitive actions and reactions among companies 
over time (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Chen and Miller 2012; 
Brito and Brito 2014). Research on competitive dynamics has 
been studying the behaviour across competing companies by 
analysing companies’ competitive movements. Studies have tak-
en up the idea that rivalry among companies (e.g., Mehra 1996; 
Más-Ruiz et al. 2005, 2014; Más-Ruiz and Moreno 2011) has an 
impact on the competitive dynamics among companies (Chen 
and MacMillan 1992; Ferrier 2001).
Competitive dynamics is the result of a set of compet-
itive actions and reactions among companies struggling 
for the same market position (Chatterjee and Samuelson 
2001; Smith et  al. 2001; Zucchini et  al. 2019). In competi-
tive dynamics, the efficiency and effectiveness of a business 
strategy is determined by the company’s competitive po-
sition in the industry and by anticipating competitors’ ac-
tions and movements (Wiersema and Bowen 2008; Kalnins 
and Chung 2004) that occur in SGs. Evidently, companies 
in a given industrial sector are at the heart of competitive 
dynamics (Mehra 1996; Más-Ruiz et al. 2005, 2014; Más-Ruiz 
and Moreno 2011), in which competitive advantages are key for 
value creation (McNamara et al. 2003). The competitive envi-
ronment takes on a key role in the competitive movements 
among companies. Such idea considers the existence of envi-
ronmental disturbances, corporate changes and direct influ-
ences on competitive actions (McGrath et al. 1998; Chen and 
Miller 2012). It is worth to consider two consequences on the 
effect of corporate behaviour. Once a disturbance occurs in 
the market, there is a direct effect on the decision-making 
of competitive measures, and companies are confronted with 
both a range of new opportunities and the need to seek a way 
to anticipate competitors, seeking to gain a market advan-
tage (McGrath et  al. 1998). The second implication, which 
affects the companies’ governance mechanisms and compet-
itive choices (Lieberman and Asaba 2006), leads to question 
the effectiveness of the decisions of past actions. In addition, 
market shocks may weaken companies’ market positioning 
by creating competitive tension in decision-making (Chen 
and Miller 2014).
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Table 1 
Overview of the dynamics of SGs in the banking industry
Researchers Analysis periods Data analysis Main findings/dynamics
Más-Ruiz (1999)
Spain, 1984–1991, 24 banks 
in 1984 and 22 banks in 
1991, four sub-periods (1984; 
1985–1986; 1987–1988; 
1989–1991).
(i) stable periods identified by the 
homogeneity of the average vector and 
covariance; (ii) analysis of clusters to 
identify SGs; and (iii) ANOVA to explain 
the intergroup differences.




Spain, 1983–1997, 92–103 
banks.
(i) Box’s M test and Hotelling’s T2 test to 
check the homogeneity of covariances and 
the averages of structures; and (ii) analysis 
of clusters to identify SGs.
Strategic stability exists at a SG level and 
at a company level, punctuated by a high 




Spain, private banks, 
1983–1997, 136 banks.




(i) Large (deposits>2 billion pesetas); 
medium (415 billion pesetas≤deposits≤2 
billion pesetas); small (deposits < 
415,000 million pesetas); (ii) Lerner 
index (describes the relationship between 
elasticity and the price margin for a profit-
maximising company) of the bank in the 
loan market.
Rivalry between patterns of SGs.
Más-Ruiz and 
Moreno (2011) Spain, 1992–1998
Low levels of competitive intensity and 
high levels of performance in companies 
within SGs of large companies (market 
power, efficiency, differentiation and 
multimarket contact).
Más-Ruiz et al. 
(2014) Spain, 1992, 1994
Rivalry within and between groups is 






Strategic positioning approach; the groups 
are formed from multivariate statistics 
(cluster) using ANOVA and MANOVA.
The structure is stable over time and shows 
signs of high mobility barriers, isolation 
mechanisms and asymmetries, which is a 
particular reality in current oligopolistic 
markets. An industry is more than the sum 
of SGs: it is a synergistic combination of 
them, whose average indicators only partially 
explain the behavior of the industrial sector.
DeSarbo and 
Grewal (2008)
United States (New 
Jersey, New York 
and Pennsylvania). 
COMPUSTAT Banks 
Database for 2001; 131 
banks.
(i) liquidity and leverage indexes; (ii) 
loan products portfolio; and (iii) deposit 
products portfolio; (iv) debt to capital; (v) 
total loans to total assets; and (vi) interest 
expenses to total assets as indicators of the 
leverage ratio.
Competition among companies depends 
on the SG and on the overlap of such 
SG with other SGs, thereby combining 
strategic revenues of more than one group.
DeSarbo et al. 
(2009)
United States (New York, 
Ohio and Pennsylvania) 
1995, 1999, 2003
(i) number of SGs; (ii) sizes of SGs; and 
(iii) development of the strategy of such 
SGs over time.
There are different evolutionary paths over 
time. There are pronounced differences in 
the company’s performance across all five 
SGs.
Note: studies (a) not pertaining to the banking industry; (b) not using data analytical techniques to derive SGs over time; (c) relying on the researcher’s 
judgement; (d) relying on an a priori classification; (e) with dynamic data, but that do not study SG dynamics have been excluded.
Source: Own elaboration.
3.  CHARACTERISATION OF THE PORTUGUESE 
BANKING SYSTEM
The Portuguese banking system went through very important 
structural changes during the last 40 years (Bento 1998; Mendes 
and Rebelo 2003). In the aftermath of the revolutionary period 
all Portuguese privately owned banks were nationalised in 1975. 
In the mid-1980s a period of profound economic liberalisation 
took place as the banking industry was reopened to the private 
initiative and in the second half of the 1980s re-privatisation of 
formerly nationalized banks took-off. In the 1990s bank credit 
ceilings were abolished (Mendes and Rebelo 2003). After 1993, 
as part of the European Union (at that time EEC), the European 
single market for financial services enabled the banking industry 
to evolve from to a fully government-controlled system to a mar-
ket-driven environment (Mendes and Rebelo 2003).
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This perspective is complemented by Silva (2009), who 
characterised the Portuguese banking system based on the 
analysis of the five largest groups (CGD, BCP, BPI, BES and 
BPSM/BST). Silva (2009) found that between 1992 and 2007: 
the ratio employee/branch declined 55%; the credit per em-
ployee increased 7.5 times; the deposit per employee increased 
3 times; and that the concentration in the banking industry in-
creased.
Silva (2009) claims that the Portuguese banking industry 
is in the hands of large Portuguese financial groups, which 
opted to homogenise their product/service portfolio and to 
reduce the number of brands. 
In the 2000s left-wing governments started to intervene 
in the banking system and in the early 2010s Portugal went 
through a severe economic/financial crisis that lead to the 
external intervention via FAEP, which led to a deep restruc-
turing of the Portuguese banking industry (Rosário 2018; 
Rosário et al. 2019).
Research analysing the Portuguese banking system is not 
abundant. Moreira and Mota (2002) analysed the concentra-
tion/segmentation challenge of the BCP/Atlântico, as a result 
of a merger and acquisition strategy. The evolutionary per-
spective of the banking system in Portugal is addressed by 
Canhoto and Dermine (2003) who claim that the join effect 
of deregulation and the granting of new banking licenses led 
to an increase on operational efficiency never experienced 
before. After a heavily regulated period after the national-
isation of all Portuguese private-owned banks, Mendes and 
Rebelo (2003) claim that in the 1990s competition, in a pe-
riod of profound economic liberalisation, was important to 
diminish market power.
According to Alcarva (2011), this competition led to the 
secundarisation of risk and profitability in order to enable 
rapid growth. This was a deliberate strategy not only to gain 
market share, but also to avoid being an easy target of hos-
tile takeovers from Spanish banks. The main drawback of this 
strategy was to increase debt so that the credit/risk assumed 
did not pay the expected dividends. This led most of the banks 
to a shortage of cash-flow and over indebtedness.
Costa (1998) analysed the 1988-1997 period and found that 
there are five clusters (universal banks; specialised banks; for-
eign banks; investment banks; international focus (credit+de-
posits)) in which banks follow different evolutionary paths.
Silva (2013) analysed the banking system in Portugal 
before and after the subprime effect and concluded that the 
most representative banks in Portugal complied with the 
stress tests, namely the required capital ratios and liquidity 
levels. The number of banks in Portugal has been diminishing 
over time (Rosário 2018; Rosário et al. 2019): there were 20 
banks in 2008; 18 in 2010; and 15 in 2013.
The Portuguese banking system is very similar to the 
Eurozone system, although more concentrated vis-à-vis the 
Spanish banking system (Alcarva 2011). The Portuguese 
banking system is highly concentrated, as the largest banks 
(CGD, BCP, BES, Santander Totta and BPI) owned around 
70% of the assets in 2010. In Spain, e.g., the largest five insti-
tutions have around 40% of the assets (Alcarva 2011).
The study of strategic groups and competitive dynamics in 
the Portuguese banking is scarce (Rosário 2018; Rosário et al. 
2019). The analysis of the 2008–2010 period found that among 
18 retail banks in Portugal, there were four main SGs (Rosário 
et al. 2019): ‘universal’, ‘traditional’, specialised’ and ‘unde-
fined’ banks. These strategic groups are going to be the bed-
rock of this paper.
In 2011, the Portuguese banking industry went through 
several legal changes (e.g., Ordinance no. 121/2011) govern-
ing the sector, through a mandatory Tier 1 Core ratio of 8% 
from the 31st of December 2011, as a result of the FEAP. On 
the other hand, Espírito Santo Financial Group (ESFG) and the 
French group Crédit Agrícole, on May 15, 2014, dissolved BE-
SPAR holding company, through which Banco Espírito Santo 
(BES) was controlled, witnessing a three-level cut in its long-
term debt rating and a two-level cut in its long-term bank de-
posits rating, due to concerns about credit capacity, with a loss 
of 3,577 million euros, culminating in the bank’s resolution in 
2014.
Based on the characterisation of the retail banking indus-
try, and taking into account that: (a) corporate strategy seeks 
to adjust internal competences and resources to the external 
context; (b) the FEAP constituted an ‘external disturbance’ as 
it led to the introduction of several legal changes, as referred 
above; and (c) changes in the number of SGs is the result of 
strategic actions posed by banks trying to adapt their strate-
gies, in which some of them will be capable of staying in the 
same SG, while others should be forced to change to another 
SG (Mascarenhas 1989; Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1993; Más-
Ruiz 1999), it is possible to draw the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: Strategic groups in Portuguese retail banking 
industry show temporary changes over time.
According to Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993) and Más-
Ruiz (1999), it is expected that individual banks with the same 
strategic characteristics follow homogeneous behaviour of the 
SG, and swap to another SG whenever they try to change their 
corporate strategies. As a result of the external disturbance 
posed by the FEAP, it is expected the individual banks are dif-
ferently prepared for the external shock and therefore be will-
ing to follow the strategy of another strategic group. As such, 
it is expected that the composition of the SGs is influenced by 
the conditions in which the banks muddle through over time. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is posed:
Hypothesis H2: The composition of strategic groups in Por-
tuguese retail banking industry differs during the three periods 
analysed.
As strategy is a continuous process over time that depends 
on the continuity of the fit between the internal competences 
with the external context, based on what was posed on the two 
previous hypotheses, and the disruptive change retail banks 
were exposed to – see for example the resolution of BES – it 
will also be hypothesised that it is not expected that all SGs 
maintain their strategic direction. As such, the third hypothesis 
is as follows:
Hypothesis H3: The external recapitalisation programme 
via the FEAP affected the Portuguese retail banking industry 
competitive dynamics.
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4. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
According to the objectives identified in the Introduction 
section, this paper analyses the reality of the Portuguese retail 
banking sector for three distinct periods, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 
and 2014-2016, which were determined following the inter-
vention of the FEAP financial assistance programme. The 
Portuguese retail banking system underwent drastic changes, 
altering the competitive environment with enormous chang-
es, reflecting the profound reforms that occurred in the sec-
tor, culminating in the resolution of BES in 2014, the leading 
Portuguese private bank. We can characterize the periods 
under analysis before the crisis, during and after the crisis. 
In this context, the Portuguese retail banking sector is empir-
ically analysed, studying its competitive dynamics and impli-
cations, discussing its strategic mobility and competitiveness, 
and determining the existence the structural stability of the 
main SGs.
4.1. Sample Identification, Data Source 
Between 2008 and 2016, the Portuguese banking sector un-
derwent profound legal changes, which regulated the industry 
with the aim of mitigating systemic risks, as a consequence of 
the major disturbance provoked by the FEAP intervention pro-
gramme. The regulatory changes, through the Basel III agree-
ment, led to major changes in the European banking industry, 
particularly in Portugal, with minimum Common Equity Tier 
1 ratios.
In this context, in order to analyse the retail banking in-
dustry we used data from statistical bulletins of the Portu-
guese Banking Association [Associação Portuguesa de Ban-
cos]. The period of analysis covered years 2008 to 2016, 
which allowed a longitudinal analysis that covers a period of 
important changes for the banking system. Data from BPN – 
Banco Português de Negócios, S.A. has not been considered 
when characterising the Portuguese financial system, since 
it was undergoing a process of integration into BIC. Data 
from EFISA – Banco Efisa, S.A. and the Branch of NCG Ban-
co, S.A. have not been included due to unavailability of in-
formation. In addition, BPP – Banco Popular Portugal, S.A. 
stopped drawing up consolidated accounts as of the 2011 
financial year, and DEUTSCHE – Deutsche Bank Portugal, 
S.A. changed its legal form to branch and adopted the name 
DEUTSCHE – Deutsche Bank AG, Branch in Portugal.
In 2014, as a result of the resolution of BES, in the char-
acterisation of the Portuguese financial system, the data refer-
ring to BES and Banco Espírito Santo dos Açores, S.A. (BCA) 
were excluded. On the other hand, the data of Novo Banco 
and NB Açores that resulted from the BES resolution were 
considered, which are the new denominations of the two en-
tities mentioned above. BANIF in 2014 presents consolidated 
accounts for the last time. Caixa Central – Caixa Central de 
Crédito Agrícola Mútuo, CRL (CCCAM) is known thereafter 
as the Sistema Integrado de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo (SICAM). 
Therefore, this study focuses on retail banking, analysing the 
period from 2008 to 2016. The total sample is composed of 23 
retail banking institutions.
4.2. Identification of Variables
The Portuguese retail banking industry bases its commer-
cial activity on revenues that come from the commercialisation 
of products/services of their branches, which are very similar 
across the industry. We decided to analyse the SGs based on cor-
porate strategic dimensions.
SGs are identified based on their strategic reach dimension, 
which in studies on the banking industry reflects the key varia-
bles of the banking industry (e.g., Espitia et al. 1991; Reger and 
Huff 1993; Rhee and Mehra 2006; Garcés-Cano and Duque-Oliva 
2008; DeSarbo et al. 2009). In this sense, we consider that strate-
gic dimensions define the competitive strategy of retail banking in 
Portugal, the latter being determined by nine strategic variables, 
reflecting the strategic reach (Table 2). The variables emerge from 
the balance sheets and individual and/or consolidated income 
statements of the Chart of Accounts for the Banking System, with 
very specific characteristics for determining/identifying the ac-
counts for financial institutions operating in Portugal.
In the literature review of the SGs of the banking system, the 
reach dimension is very particular of the strategic groups, as is 
a key dimension of the banking industry that reflects the differ-
ent products and services of the banking system (e.g., Reger and 
Huff 1993; Garcés and Duque 2007; DeSarbo et al. 2009).
Table 2 






Credit not represented by securities / Total 
Assets. V1
Securitised and non-derecognised credit / 
Total Assets V2
Other credit and values (tittles) / Total Assets V3
Overdue credit and interest loan / Total Assets V4
Provisions and Impairments / Total Assets V5
Call-Demand deposits / Total Liabilities V6
Term Deposits / Total Liabilities V7
Resources. Central Bank Resources / Total Liabilities V8
Size of the 
institution. Total Assets V9
Source: Own elaboration.
We selected six ratios that are regularly used to reflect 
the level of results of banks. Those results are expressed 
in relative terms and are strongly influenced by personnel 
and administrative expenses (Sinkey and Joseph 1992), as 
shown in Table 3.
For the analysis of performance ratios it was taken into 
account the need of the banking industry to comply with the 
FEAP requirements imposed by the regulatory changes of the 
Basel III agreement, which was expected to influence the re-
tail banking activity. There are many aims for capitalising and 
leveraging the Portuguese banking sector: (i) strengthening 
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financial strength ratios, whereas the increase in solvency to a 
minimum of 9% until the end of 2011 and of 10% from 2012 
has become mandatory; (ii) decreasing the transformation ra-
tio, by reducing credit weight on deposits to a maximum of 
120% until the end of 2014; (iii) lowering stable funding to 
100% until the end of 2014, which is a measure intended to 
reduce dependence on short-term markets; (iv) reducing ex-
posure to the European Central Bank (ECB); financial insti-
tutions were required to reduce dependence on ECB funding, 
to facilitate the return to the markets in 2013; and, lastly, (v) 
maintaining credit to the productive sector, with the guide-
line of continuing funding the Portuguese economic fabric, 
with added focus on small and medium-sized enterprises en-
gaged in tradable goods, and the banking sector started hav-
ing a quarterly assessment of capital and liquidity plans from 
the eight largest banks. Therefore, the economic and financial 
ratios chosen are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 
Result variables






PBMF Banking product / Financial margin.
CPMF Costs with Personnel / Financial margin.
GGAMF 
General administrative 





Return on Equity (Net 
results / Shareholder 
Equity).
ROI 
Return on Investment 
(Net results / Total 
Assets).
GAF 
Degree of financial 
leverage (Operational 
results / EBIT). 
Source: Own elaboration.
4.3. Data Analysis Procedure
In order to achieve the objectives defined in the introducto-
ry section, the following stages were defined to analyse the retail 
banking industry: (i) The identification of the periods of analysis; 
(ii) The identification of the different SGs; (iii) The characterisa-
tion the SGs; (iv) The analysis of the competitive dynamics of SGs; 
(v) The analysis of differences between SGs; and, finally, (vi) The 
analysis of strategic consequences of competitive dynamics.
The definition of the periods of analysis was determined a 
priori as composed by the following periods of time: 2008-2010, 
2011-2013 and 2014-2016. This was the first stage of the study. 
This subjective selection of aims at identifying changes occurred 
over time, recognising breaking points in stable periods (e.g., Zúñi-
ga et al. 2004a; Ebbes et al. 2010; Más-Ruiz and Moreno 2011; 
Más-Ruíz et al. 2014), based on previous knowledge of the retail 
banking industry and from the FEAP intervention.
Different hierarchical clustering algorithms were tested 
(single, average and complete linkage, as well as the Ward’s 
algorithm) and some similar solutions between them were 
obtained, suggesting the existence of some possible natural 
groups. Thus, given its desirable properties, the Ward’s algo-
rithm (Ward Jr. 1963) was elected for the work. To determine 
SGs based on the corporate conduct for the three periods of 
analysis, this second stage involves the creation of clusters 
using the Ward’s method (e.g., Más-Ruiz et  al. 1992; Reger 
and Huff 1993; Martins et al. 2010; Pätäri et al. 2011). The 
Ward’s hierarchical algorithm of minimum variance is ap-
plied to the standardized mean values of the variables of each 
bank for the three periods under analysis. This procedure has 
shown superior results when compared to other methods of 
hierarchical groupings, revealing a natural structure of the 
data (e.g., Fombrun and Zajac 1987; Más-Ruiz et  al. 1992; 
Reger and Huff 1993; Martins et al. 2010; Pätäri et al. 2011).
The third stage involves the characterisation of the SGs’ 
dimension in order to identify similar and dissimilar strategic 
behaviours. The next procedures have been implemented for 
that purpose, following Amel and Rhoades (1988): (i) calcu-
lating the average values of strategic variables regarding each 
SG in the identified stability periods; (ii) calculating the aver-
age values of the indicators of the stability periods regarding 
the entire banking industry; and (iii) comparing the averages 
of each SG to the average of the sample in order to identify 
any degree of specialisation in the SGs in any specific strate-
gic dimension. 
Competitive dynamics of SGs in the banking industry 
in Portugal, in the periods from 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and 
2014-2016, is analysed transversally in relation to the com-
position and its changes over time, as well as the strategies 
undertaken by the SGs. It is based on comparing the average 
values of strategic variables in each strategic group and ana-
lysing the centroids of SGs in each period of analysis of the 
Portuguese retail banking industry.
The fourth stage involves a discussion regarding the fea-
tures of the competitive dynamics of SGs according to the 
structure proposed by Mascarenhas (1989). Given the likeli-
hood of a strategic change of some banks in a given SG, there 
are three possible results: a change in its strategy, in its compo-
sition and/or in the number of its members. This is the result 
of the interdependence between the members of the group, 
swapping between SGs or of using a diverging strategy from 
the members of the SG. In this sense, a strategic change may 
occur when some banks in the same SG change their strategy. 
The change in the composition of a SG means that some re-
tail bank changed its strategy and is implementing a different 
strategy, which might be tuned to the strategy of another SG. If 
the remaining members of the group do not follow the change, 
we are in the presence of a new SG or a change in the compo-
sition of two SGs. 
The fifth stage aims at analysing the differences in results 
of the SGs. Lastly, the sixth stage discusses the strategic conse-
quences of competitive dynamics of SGs in the Portuguese retail 
banking industry.
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5. RESULTS
This paper analyses the unfolding of events culminating in the 
2011 recapitalisation programme of the Portuguese banking sys-
tem and in the resolution of BES in 2014. The major changes in 
the Portuguese banking system during the 2008-2010, 2011-2013 
and 2014-2016 periods are explained by the recapitalisation pro-
gramme of the Portuguese banking system via the FEAP, which 
changed the competitive environment of the banking system, by 
introducing significant changes in the sector’s behaviour, particu-
larly regarding the compliance with the new solvency levels im-
posed on banks and the need to deleverage the banking activity.
Table 4 shows the development of average values of strategic 
variables in the periods under analysis. From the first to the sec-
ond period, there is a clear fall in the average ratio of credit not 
represented by securities on total assets from 0.54 (2008-2010) 
to 0.44 (2011-2013) albeit it increases in the third period (0.48). 
The average ratio of overdue credit and interest on total assets 
increased from 0.01 to 0.03 to 0.04 during the three periods. The 
same occurred to the provisions and impairments on total assets 
that increased from a null average value to an average value of 
0.03 and then to an average value of 0.05 in the 2014-2016 peri-
od. There was a decrease in the average ratio of call deposits on 
total assets, from 0.20 to 0.09, from the first to the second period 
and an improvement to 0.06 from the second to the third period. 
Conversely, the average ratio of central bank resources on total 
liabilities went from 0.06 in the first period to 0.11 in the second 
period to 0.07 in the third period The average increase of 3,021 
Million euros in total assets from the first period to the second 
one should also be noted, as well as a decrease of 2,310.57 Mil-
lion Euros from the second to the third period.
Table 4 
Strategic variables over time periods
Variables Operationalisation 2008-2010 2011-2013 2014-2016
V1 Credit not represented by securities / Total Assets 0.54 0.44 0.48
V2
Securitised and non-
derecognised credit / 
Total Assets
0.04 0.07 0.07
V3 Other credit and values (tittles) / Total Assets 0.01 0.03 0.04
V4 Overdue credit and interest loan / Total Assets 0.01 0.03 0.04
V5
Provisions and 
Impairments / Total 
Assets
0.00 0.03 –0.05
V6 Call-Demand deposits / Total Liabilities 0.20 0.09 0.16
V7 Term Deposits / Total Liabilities 0.15 0.29 0.35
V8 Central Bank Resources / Total Liabilities 0.06 0.11 0.07
V9 Total Assets (1) 24,209.07 27,230.97 24,920.40
Note: (1) Million Euros.
Source: Own elaboration.
The SGs have been classified as: “Universal”; “Tradition-
al”; “Specialised”; and “Undefined” SGs. This classification is 
based on article 4 of Decree-Law no. 298/92. It has the scope 
of the banking activity as reference for naming the SG, which 
discloses the main strategic feature of each strategic cluster 
or group.
Taking into account the assets of the banks, the SG named 
“Universal Banking” is composed of: small institutions in the 
2008-2010 period; very small, small and medium-sized institu-
tions in the 2011-2013 period; and two medium-sized institu-
tions and a large institution in the 2014-2016 period.
The second SG may be referred as “Traditional Banking”. 
In the 2008-2010 period, based on the size of the assets of the 
banks, this SG is comprised of three large banks and one me-
dium bank. In this SG – composed of banks that traditionally 
operate at a national level covering all market segments – the 
primary strategic variables influencing the SG are: total as-
sets, credit not represented by securities and securitised and 
non-derecognised credit. In the 2011-2013 period, it is com-
posed of one small institution, two medium-sized institutions 
and three large institutions. In the 2014-2016 period is com-
posed of one very small, two small and two large banks. This 
SG is comprised of banks that traditionally operate at national 
level serving all market segments, and is expressed by the fol-
lowing strategic variables: total assets, credit not represented by 
securities, demand deposits and a high central bank resource 
ratio on total liabilities.
The third SG is referred as “Specialised Banking”. It is com-
posed of three very small banks and one small bank in the 
2008-2010 period. In the 2011-2013 period, this SG is com-
posed of two very small banks and one medium bank. In the 
2014-2016 period it is composed of two very small, one small 
and one mid-sized institution. This SG can be characterised by 
the following two variables: securitised and non-derecognised 
credit on total assets and a high central bank resource ratio on 
total liabilities.
The fourth SG may be referred as “Undefined Banking” as it 
is difficult to prescribe the strategic variables that characterise 
this SG. BIC is a very small bank that incorporated BPN in 2011 
and BPI is a medium-sized bank. Novo Banco, which is a large 
bank, belongs to this SG in the 2014-2016 period.
In order to complement the analysis of the composition of the 
SG, it was used the proposal of Reger and Huff (1993) that char-
acterises SGs according to the structural position in the cluster. 
Based on the Euclidean square distance among individual play-
ers, Reger and Huff (1993) distinguish the following typologies: 
“core”; “secondary”; “transient”; “misfit” and “idiosyncratic”, 
as shown in Table 5. As such, one can claim that “core” players 
are closer the core of the SG and “idiosyncratic” are likely to 
have a poor resemblance to the SG behaviour, i.e. the higher the 
Euclidean square distance the less likely the player is to remain 
in the SG.
Table 5 characterises the SGs in terms of number and compo-
sition for the three periods analysed. For simplicity reasons, the 
Undefined Banking SG was not represented. In summary, na-
tional banking institutions have developed different strategies in 
the three time periods (2008-2010, 2011-2013 and 2014-2016), 
impacting the structure of SGs.
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Over the three time periods MG and BANIF maintained 
their strategies as secondary players, but as part of the Uni-
versal Banking SG in the first period, as part of the Tradi-
tional Banking SG in the second period and as part of the 
Specialized Banking in the third period. BCP and CGD re-
main in the Traditional Banking SG during the three peri-
ods, although they changed their strategic behaviour as they 
behaved as core players in the first period and as secondary 
players in the second and third periods. On the other hand, 
BES also maintains its position in the Traditional Banking SG. 
It moved from a core to a secondary position from the first to 
the second period, becoming insolvent in the third period. 
Part of its assets were transferred to Novo Banco, which is 
part of the Undefined SG. Finally, the BST in the first period 
is in the Traditional Banking SG behaving as secondary play-
er. In the second period BST moves to the Universal SG as a 
transient player, remaining in the Universal Banking SC as a 
core player.
Table 5 
Characterisation of the composition of main SGs in the periods under analysis
Universal Banking Traditional Banking Specialised Banking
Period 2008/10 2011/13 2014/16 2008/10 2011/13 2014/16 2008/10 2011/13 2014/16
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Source: Own elaboration.
The Undefined Banking group was not represented in Table 5 
because it does not include any institution in the second period – 
for all purposes, it was deemed as a strategically undefined group 
comprised of two medium institutions seeking to position them-
selves in the banking market, becoming included in the Univer-
sal Banking strategic group by means of strategic redefinition. 
As shown in Table 5, in the first period there are four SGs 
(Universal, Traditional, Specialised, Undefined), while the sec-
ond period is composed of three SGs (Universal, Traditional, 
Specialised), since the Undefined SG has disappeared. Finally, 
the third period is composed of four main SGs (Universal, Tradi-
tional, Specialised, Undefined), with Novo Banco being set aside 
as part of the Undefined SG as its only member.
Table 6 presents the individual characteristics of the three 
main SGs over time.
The Universal Banking SG experienced the following trans-
formations from the first to the second period: from eight bank-
ing institutions (MG acquired Finibanco in 2010) to six; their 
number of workers decreases from 36,415 to 4,987; and total as-
sets increase from 65,993 to 103,841 Million euros. In the third 
period the number of institutions decreases to three, the num-
ber of workers increases to 22,286 and total assets decrease again 
to 86,027 million Euros. BPP, BAC, BST and BBVA behaved as 
structural players of the Universal Banking SG during the first 
two periods.
The Traditional Banking SG also undergoes important chang-
es from the first to the second period: from four to six institu-
tions; from 3,159 to 3,762 offices; from 27,816 to 33,629 workers; 
and total assets remain relatively stable from 330,095 to 311,702 
million euros. In the third period the number of institutions de-
creases to five, with an increase in the number of workers to 
59,989 and a decrease in total assets to 162,044 million Euros. 
Clearly, BCP (during the three periods) and BES (during the first 
two periods) remained as structural players within this SG, with 
the entry of CCCAM and MG coming from the strategic group 
of Universal Banking in the second period, and BST exiting in 
the first period. BBVA enters the Traditional SG leaving the Uni-
versal Banking SG.
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The Specialized Banking SG underwent the follow-
ing changes from the first to the second period: from four 
to three institutions; from 251 to 236 offices; from 2,456 to 
2,317 workers; and total assets of 24,382 to 26,546 million eu-
ros. BARCLAYS (during the first two periods) and BF (dur-
ing the three periods) are its structural institutions. In the 
third period, this SG has four institutions, 12,312 employees 
and a total asset of 40,891 million Euros. Clearly, BANIF 
and MG become major players coming from the Traditional 
Banking SG.
For simplicity reasons the Undefined Banking SG is not rep-
resented in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 6 
Characteristics of the main strategic groups
Periods Strategic groups Number of entities Number of offices (1) Number of workers (2) Total assets (3)
2008-2010 
Universal Banking 8 (4) 1 793 (4) 36 415 (4)  65 993 437.33
Traditional Banking 4 3 159 27 816 330 095 376.00
Specialized Banking 4   251  2 456  24 381 963.83
2011-2013
Universal Banking 6 1 753  4 987 103 841 953.03
Traditional Banking 6 3 762 33 629 311 702 424.68
Specialized Banking 3   236  2 317  26 546 115.47
2014-2016
Universal Banking 3 1 378 22 286  86 026 997.00
Traditional Banking 5 1 276 59 989 162 043 810.30
Specialized Banking 4   352 12 312  40 891 270.00
Note: (1) coverage in Portugal; (2) in Portugal; (3) thousands of euros; (4) Finibanco in 2010 was purchased by Montepio.
Source: Own elaboration.
As shown in Tables 5 and 7, the following changes were iden-
tified between the first and the second period: Eight changes have 
been identified in the Universal Banking strategic group: MG, 
CCCAM and BANIF became part of the Traditional BG; BIC and 
BPI left the Undefined Banking; BST left the Traditional Banking 
group; DEUTSCHE left the Universal Banking and FINE entered 
into the Universal Banking. Four changes have been identified 
in the Traditional Banking SG: entry of MG, BANIF and CCCA 
from the Universal Banking and BST leaving to the Universal 
Banking strategic group. Three changes have been identified in 
the Specialised SG: ITAU and BSNP leaving in the first period 
and BSC’s entry in the second period. On the other hand, be-
tween the second period and the third periods, the following ma-
jor changes are clear: BAC with the resolution of BES in 2014, is 
no longer present, BBVA and BPP are now part of the Traditional 
Banking group. MG and BANIF that comprised the Traditional 
Banking SG moved to the Specialized Banking SG.
SGs have been analysed from both a longitudinal and a com-
position standpoint, by identifying the number of groups and its 
variation over time (2008-2016). It was possible to identify 17 
strategic changes by comparing the first and the second periods, 
translating into a strategic redefinition of the institutions that have 
become integrated in other SGs. Between the second and the third 
periods 13 strategic changes were identified, as shown in Table 7.
The mobility ratio is calculated by identifying the number of 
banks remaining in the same strategic group, as well as the number 
of times they move from a given SG to another. As shown in Ta-
ble 7, mobility between SGs – assessed by the mobility ratio (MR) 
– is medium/high between the first and the second periods (average 
MR = 0.346). This medium/high strategic mobility likely reflects the 
troubled period of adaptation occurred in the banking industry as 
a result of the FEAP, which led to the strategic adjustment of the 
different players. On the other hand, a milder mobility ratio is found 
between the second and the third period (average MR = 0.277).
Table 7 
Mobility ratios (MR) between periods
2008-2010 and 2011-2013 2011-2013 and 2014-2016
Strategic Groups Remains in SGs Changes among SGs MR* Average MR Remains in SGs
Changes 
among SGs MR* Average MR




Traditional Banking 3 4 0.429 3 6 0.333
Specialised Banking 3 3 0.500 2 3 0.400
Undefined Banking 2 2 0.500 0 1 0
Note: *Mobility Ratio (MR); MR = 1 no mobility (perfect strategic stability); RM = 0 total mobility (perfect strategic instability).
Source: Own elaboration.
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Between the first and the second period the Universal 
Banking group is the most mobile SG (MR = 0.111) and the 
Undefined Banking is the SG with the least mobility. In turn, 
the Specialised and Undefined Banking are the SGs with the 
least mobility (MR = 0.500). Between the first and the second 
period, the Undefined SG is the SG with the most mobility, 
whereas the Universal Banking SG is the one with the least 
mobility (MR = 0.500). This reorganisation suggests there is 
a low barrier to mobility between periods, resulting in a low 
barrier to the entry of institutions into other strategic groups, 
with strategic mobility diversity. It can be argued that the three 
periods are characterised by different strategic behaviours. The 
first period can be characterised as a period of deregulation of 
the Portuguese retail banking industry, and the second period 
as resulting from an imposed regulation, in which institutions 
have been reorganised into SGs in order to adapt to the new 
economic and legal framework. Finally, the third period can 
be considered as a period of strategic consolidation.
The analysis of the dynamics of SGs was based on the av-
erage values and standard deviations of strategic variables in 
each SG. The results of the strategic variables are not uni-
form, thereby evidencing that there are differences in deci-
sions across strategic groups over time. The structure of the 
SGs changed over time, and the changes demonstrate that the 
banking institutions of a SG reorganise themselves seeking a 
new competitive strategic positioning. The results obtained 
show that not all retail banking institutions move in the same 
way due to the changing relative distance between the mem-
bers of a same group over time. Competitive responses from 
the institutions to the environment differ in decision-making 
and time thereof.
Table 8 shows the average values of the result variables 
between periods. There is an average increase of the banking 
product ratio on the financial margin (BPMF), from 0.647 
(2008-2010) to 2.010 (2011-2013) and to 1.938 (2014-2016). 
The average ratio of personnel expenses on the financial mar-
gin (PEFM) went from 0.204 to 0.642 from the first to the sec-
ond period and to 0.591 in the third period; the general admin-
istrative expenses ratio on the financial margin (GAEFM) went 
from 0.175 to 0.446 from the first to the second period and 
stabilised in the third period (0.420); ROE (return on equity) 
went from minus 0.003 to an average value of minus 0.204 and 
then to a minus 0.069; ROI becomes negative with an average 
value of minus 0.076 in the second period and then to a minus 
0.002 in the third period; lastly, the degree of financial leverage 
went from 1.006 to an average value of 0.962 in the second peri-
od to 0.646 in the third period. There is a clear increase in costs 
(PEFM and GAEFM) and decrease in financial profitability, 
indicating deterioration of the banking competitive context. 
This indicates a deterioration of the competitive context in the 
banking system in the first two periods, with a decrease in costs 
(PBMF and CPMF) between the second and third period and 
with a decrease in financial profitability in the three periods 
under analysis.
In this framework, the different results over the periods are 
shown in Table 8, according to the SGs (Universal, Traditional, 
Specialised and Undefined), using the simple arithmetic aver-
age for each strategic group and for each period under study.
Table 8 
Results of strategic groups







PBMF: Banking product / Financial margin
2008-2010 1.800 1.592 1.951 1.859 0.647
2011-2013 2.313 1.754 1.371 — (1) 2.010
2014-2016 1.572 2.232 1.938 1.989 1.938
CPMF: Costs with Personnel / Financial margin
2008-2010 0.542 0.490 0.985 0.616 0.204
2011-2013 0.781 0.000 0.358 — (1) 0.642
2014-2016 0.337 0.736 0.527 0.970 0.591
GGAMF: General administrative expenses / 
Financial margin
2008-2010 0.366 0.560 0.626 0.679 0.175
2011-2013 0.516 0.000 0.491 — (1) 0.446
2014-2016 0.234 0.522 0.337 0.808 0.420
ROE: Return on Equity
2008-2010 0.064 –0.887 –0.133 0.049 –0.003
2011-2013 –0.094 –2.529 0.311 — (1) –0.204
2014-2016 0.053 –0.091 –0.130 –0.165 –0.069
ROI: Return on Investment
2008-2010 0.004 0.000 –0.009 0.001 0.002
2011-2013 –0.044 –0.007 –0.503 — (1) –0.076
2014-2016 0.003 –0.003 –0.003 –0.016 –0.002
GAF: Degree of financial leverage
2008-2010 0.827 0.652 0.946 2.534 1.006
2011-2013 1.265 0.942 1.117 — (1) 0.962
2014-2016 0.891 0.562 0.746 1.024 0.646
Note: (1) no data.
Source: Own elaboration.
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The Universal Banking SG is composed of banks operating 
in their broader sense. This SG has a negative ROE and ROI in 
the second period, influenced by the net result, and shows a fa-
vourable average leverage in the second period (1.265) that was 
unfavourable in the preceding period (0.827), decreasing again 
in the third period (0.891).
The Traditional Banking SG has a negative ROE in the three 
periods (–0.887; –2.529; –0,091), influenced by the net results, 
which, in turn, have a negative influence on ROI in the three 
periods. The results of the Traditional Banking SG worsened in 
the second period, expressing a low ROE (–2.529) improving 
in the third period (–0,091). Lastly, the three periods have an 
unfavourable leverage, improving in the second period (0.942), 
decreasing again in the third period. The Undefined Banking SG 
is characterised by an extremely favourable leverage, with an av-
erage value of 2.534 in the first period.
It is clear that the change of the competitive environment 
from a deregulated period to a regulated period and then to a 
consolidated strategic period significantly changed the composi-
tion between periods. Intervention from the FEAP, the Europe-
an Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
conditioned individual strategies of retail banking institutions 
in Portugal. This constraint led to deep changes in the banking 
activity and caused surgical time changes so as to not introduce 
large uncertainties in the activity of the institutions, which led 
to a period of consolidation conditioning the results obtained in 
the banking industry in a decisive manner. The existence of rela-
tionships between structure – conduct – performance and com-
petition indicates an asymmetrical growth in behaviour, show-
ing the difficulties of establishing commitments among banking 
entities, thereby reducing the benefits for retail banking. The 
mechanisms of competitive dynamics of SGs are clear between 
and within periods, which is also the case within and between 
strategic groups, due to the fact that they are responding to the 
changes in the competitive environment.
The national retail banking system is comprised of three 
primary strategic groups: the Universal, the Traditional and the 
Specialised SGs. It can be argued that competitive dynamics oc-
curs with greater intensity among members in the same group 
due to the conduct of its members in relation to the activity, cre-
ating barriers to mobility and responding in a similar way to the 
changes in the competitive environment. In addition, it is impor-
tant to take account the existence of a mutual dependence that 
may be obstructed by some actors. As such, one can claim that 
hypotheses H1 and H2 are accepted.
The national retail banking sector is comprised of SGs that 
underwent major changes between the periods under analysis, 
due to the changes imposed on the competitive environment. 
The study does not prove that strategic groups are necessarily a 
cohesive force. In the second period under analysis (2011-2013) 
there was a greater concern in complying with the requirements 
of the FEAP than in addressing market competition. The fulfil-
ment of the imposed goals had a decisive influence on the com-
position and competitive dynamics of SGs, whose number, com-
position and strategies have changed. In addition, it is apparent 
that managers/decision-makers are aware of the implications of 
strategic decisions and recognise the existence of SGs, as well as 
their competitive dynamics. Decisions made by bank managers 
or strategic decision-makers by virtue of the FEAP have been 
different between banking institutions, regardless of the SG in 
which they were integrated. Such decisions have shaped the stra-
tegic groups in the second period of analysis and the search for 
a consolidation in the third period. Therefore, it can be argued 
that different decisions have shaped competitive dynamics of 
the retail banking, led by the three – “Universal”, “Traditional” 
and “Specialised” – main SGs. Competitive dynamics of strategic 
groups has direct and indirect implications on the conduct of re-
tail banking institutions, their results, the nature of the competi-
tive interactions between banking institutions in a same SG and 
between SGs in a same industry. As such, one can claim that H3 is 
accepted as competitive dynamics of the banking industry is af-
fected by the external recapitalisation programme via the FEAP.
6. CONCLUSION
The study shows the different SGs in Portugal’s retail banking 
sector during the three periods. The analysis allows to reflect on 
the competitive dynamics of SGs and the (in)direct implications 
on companies’ conduct, results and the nature of competitive 
interactions. It is clear that the Portuguese retail banks follow 
different competitive strategies, SGs have dissimilar resources 
and that different SGs follow different strategies. Variables used 
in the analysis support the argument that the retail banking in 
Portugal has changed its commitments and strategies over time, 
as financial profitability and degree of financial leverage have de-
teriorated from the first to the second analysis period.
National banking institutions have developed different strat-
egies in all three time periods under study, stimulating the re-
structuring of SGs as to their number and composition, signif-
icantly reflecting the existence of a deep volatility between the 
periods under analysis, which indicates there were changes in 
the context of banking with the mandatory requirements deter-
mined by the BdP [Bank of Portugal] and imposed by the FEAP, 
of a Tier 1 Core ratio of 8% from the 31st of December 2011 that 
enforced minimum capital requirements through Ordinance no. 
121/2011. The competitive structure of the retailing banking 
industry is reflected on the different SGs formed, in which the 
concern for complying with the requirements imposed by the re-
capitalisation programme of the Portuguese banking system led 
to the reorganisation and restructuring of SGs. Thus, the differ-
ent periods of analysis may be characterised by a medium/high 
strategic mobility, which presumably reflects a low barrier to the 
entry into SGs. Therefore, it can be argued that the 2008-2010 
period may be considered as a ‘deregulated’ period, 2011-2013 
as a period of ‘imposed regulation’ and, finally, 2014-2016 as a 
‘strategic consolidation’ period, with strategic changes leading 
the various institutions to strategically regroup, as a result of a 
low barrier to strategic mobility, which led to a broad competi-
tive dynamics between periods.
There are important implications for the scientific commu-
nity. The first one is that this financial and economic foreign in-
tervention had pervasive structural changes in the Portuguese 
banking industry. This is the result of not only the lack of in-
dustry-based stability, but also the individual conditions to the 
banks, which were not analysed. The second implication is that 
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a tight regulation seems to be mandatory if the banking industry 
is to perform properly, which was not the case under analysis as 
its historical events indicated.
For the business community it would be important to claim 
that despite the intricacies of strategic actions and reactions in-
stitutions need to be aware of the contextual signs that strongly 
influence the long-term stability of corporate strategies. As such, 
if institutions want to stay afloat in open competitive markets, 
they need to define a clear long-term strategic orientation not to 
be caught in the eye of the storm.
The results contribute to the understanding of the retail bank-
ing in Portugal, namely: (i) the competitive position of the players 
in the sector; (ii) the structure and competitive dynamics; (iii) the 
analysis of the SGs and their competitive dynamics; and (iv) the 
analysis of the competitive the dynamics of the SGs of the Portu-
guese banking sector in the three periods under analysis.
The main limitation of this paper is related to the analysed 
time horizon – only three time periods, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 
and 2014-2016 – that was extremely volatile in the Portuguese 
banking sector. The second limitation is related to the small sam-
ple used. Finally, due to the subjectivity associated to any cluster 
analysis, the results should be interpreted by taking into account 
the limitations of this statistical methodology. De la Fuente-Sa-
baté et al. (2007) and Carroll and Thomas (2019) propose new 
methodological and theoretical insights in the research on stra-
tegic groups that should be considered in future work to study 
the retail banking behaviour. 
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